This paper considers generalized Lorenz-maximal solutions in the core of a convex TU-game and demonstrates that such solutions satisfy coalitional monotonicity and population monotonicity.
Introduction
A well-known result in Young (1985) states that no core solution concept with respect to transferable utility (TU) games satisfies coalitional monotonicity (in the sense that if the worth of a coalition increases ceteris paribus, no member of the coalition should receive a decreasing payoff).
This trade-off between coalitional stability, in terms of core constraints, and coalitional monotonicity is unfortunate as illustrated very clearly for the case of cost sharing games.
When cost sharing rules are used in organizations it is important that they are coalitional monotonic since otherwise (some) agents do not have incentives to reduce costs, cf. e.g., Shubik (1962) and Young (1994) . Moreover, coalitional stability with respect to cost sharing games is equivalent to the well-known standalone cost principle stating that no coalition will accept to pay more than their stand-alone cost. Hence, a trade-off between monotonicity and coalitional stability seems difficult to accept.
Moreover, it has long been recognized that population monotonicity is another important monotonicity property, see e.g., Thomson (1995) . A solution fails to be population monotonic, if (some) agents have incentives to block the introduction of new agents. In other words, if insiders are able to block the inclusion of new agents, population monotonicity ensures that no agents will exploit their power irrespectively of the contribution of the outsiders.
In the particular case of convex games, it is well known that (both types of) monotonicity and stability can be compatible as demonstrated by the Shapley value, see Shapley (1971) , Sprumont (1990) and Rosenthal (1990) . On the other hand, certainly not all core solutions satisfy both types of monotonicity. On the class of convex games the well known core solution the nucleolus fails to satisfy both coalitional-and population monotonicity, see Hokari (2000a) and Sönmez (1994) .
In the present paper we consider the Dutta-Ray solution (or Egalitarian solution, cf. Dutta and Ray (1989) ) which on the class of convex games coincides with the Lorenz maximal imputation in the core, see also Hougaard, Peleg and ThorlundPetersen (2001) . As such the Dutta-Ray solution is a core selection rule that explicitly relates to a fairness criterion in terms of equality. Contrary to the nucleolus, it has been shown that the Dutta-Ray solution is indeed population monotonic (Dutta (1990) ) and coalitional monotonic (Hokari (2000b) ) on the class of convex games. We extend these results by proving that a generalized Lorenz solution concept also satisfies coalitional-as well as population monotonicity.
Subject to the core constraints the generalized Lorenz solution maximizes a social utility function defined as the sum of individual utilities. Each individual utility function is assumed to be strictly concave and it depends only on the agents own payoff (in monetary terms). Therefore, compared to the DuttaRay solution (where all agents are supposed to have the same individual utility function) the generalization opens up for asymmetry in terms of individual utilities. Such an asymmetric treatment of players may seem reasonable in cases where, for example, the players differ in wealth prior to the game or, by some other standards, need 'positive' discrimination subject to economic efficiency in terms of the core constraints. Hence, the use of generalized Lorenz solutions follows the same line of argument that underlies the use of weighted Shapley values, asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions etc. (see e.g., Kalai and Samet (1988) and Peters (1992) ).
Finally, we notice that Hokari (2002) also introduces a generalization of the Dutta-Ray solution on the class of convex games called a monotone-path Dutta-Ray solution. He claims that our generalized Lorenz solution can be defined as a monotone-path solution. This claim, however, is incorrect and consequently our results below cannot be inferred from his analysis. For example, the monotonepath in his Example 2 (iii) is not well defined and his condition (iv) is in general not satisfied using our definition.
Definitions and Notation
Assume that there is an infinite set of potential players (agents) indexed by N, the set of natural numbers. Let N be the class of non-empty, finite subsets of N. A coalitional game (with transferable utility) is a pair (N, v) , N ∈ N where v is a function that associates a real number v(S) with each subset S of N. As usual v(∅) = 0. We write v instead of (N, v) , when the set of players is fixed and can be omitted for notational simplicity.
A member x of R N is called a payoff vector. If x ∈ R N and S ⊆ N we write
Denote by Γ N , the class of convex games v for N ∈ N . The core of v, C(v) , is defined by Shapley 1971) . A solution of a game v is a function φ which allocates v(N ) among all the players, i.e., φ(v) = x where x(N ) = v(N ).
Let u i : R → R, i ∈ N be strictly concave differentiable functions. Now, let v ∈ Γ N and define the generalized Lorenz solution as
The solution φ GL (v) is well defined because u i , i ∈ N are strictly concave and
By Theorem 2 in Hougaard, Peleg and Thorlund-Petersen (2001) the generalized Lorenz solution coincides with the Lorenz-maximal imputation in the core of a game
, for all i ∈ N . Note also that for convex games the Lorenzmaximal imputation in the core of a game v coincides with the Egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) -the Dutta-Ray solution.
A solution φ satisfies coalitional monotonicity if for all coalitions S and all i ∈ S that,
N } the class of convex games with a finite set of players. Let x ∈ R N and v ∈ Γ N . For S ⊆ N , let x S be the restriction of x to S, and let v |S be the restriction of v to S.
Coalitional Monotonicity
Using the algorithm provided in Dutta and Ray (1989) it is simple to show that the Dutta-Ray solution is coalitional monotonic, see also Hokari (2000b) . In this section we will, more surprisingly, demonstrate that the generalized Lorenz solution is coalitional monotonic as well.
Let Γ N be the set of all convex games on a fixed set of players N , and let u i : R → R be strictly concave differentiable functions. Consider the generalized Lorenz solution
First we observe the following result.
Lemma 1. φ GL (v) is a continuous function of v.
Proof. The core C(v) is a continuous correspondence. Hence, by the Theorem of the Maximum (see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) ) φ GL (v) is upper hemicontinuous. As φ GL is a function it is, in fact, continuous.
Thus, P is actually an ordered partition. We also denote the set of zero-excess coalitions
is a ring, that is, it is closed under union and intersection.
Proof. Let i ∈ P h and j ∈ P l where h < l.
, there exists S ij ∈ Z(x) such that i ∈ S ij and j ∈ S ij (no transfer of money from i to j is possible). Let
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Then S i ∈ Z(x) and
First, however, we prove a local version of coalitional monotonicity.
As φ GL (w t ) is a continuous function of t, we may choose 0 < ε ≤t such that
Now, let 0 < t ≤ ε, let y(t) = y, and y(0) = x. Denote by
the set of players who are worse off in the game w t . We shall prove that
and letP = (P 1 , . . . ,P q ) be the partition induced by y. Then, by (3.5),P is a refinement of P, and we shall use this fact in connection with Lemma 2 repeatedly in the following.
and y(T ) = w t (T ) ≥ v(T ) by Lemma 2. Hence y(T ) ≥ x(T ). Let
T = P 1 ∪ · · · ∪ P l \(P l ∩ Q).
Clearly, y(T \T ) < x(T \T ), implying that
Moreover, asP is a refinement of P (see (3.5)) we have that P l ∩ Q =P j1 ∪· · ·∪P j h . Hence, by Lemma 2, y(T ) = w t (T ) and by (3.6), x(T ) = v(T ). Now, we distinguish between two cases:
If l = 1, then the proof is complete. If l > 1, then we will show that Q ∩ P h = ∅, h = 1, . . . , l − 1. Indeed, assume on the contrary that h < l and
Thus we have reached the desired contradiction.
We are now able to prove coalitional monotonicity when the utility functions are differentiable.
L is non-empty (0 ∈ L), and it is closed by Lemma 1. By Lemma 3, L is open. Hence, L = I because I is connected. Remark 1. Using the generalized Lorenz solution suitable choice of utility functions u i may select any imputation in the core. Thus, Theorem 1 indirectly verifies that the core also satisfies coalitional montonicity on the class of convex games. (See, e.g., Megiddo (1974) for a precise definition of coalitional monotonicity for set valued functions).
Population Monotonicity
Proving population monotonicity, we proceed with a number of intermediate lemmata. The first result demonstrates a very useful property of convex games.
Lemma 4. Let v ∈
Γ N and S ⊂ N, x = (x S , x N \S ) ∈ C(v), y S ∈ C(v |S ) and x(S) = y(S). Then (y S , x N \S ) ∈ C(v).
Proof. First note that since x(S) = y(S) = v(S), S is a zero-excess coalition at x in v.
Assume that there exists a coalition Q that is a zero-excess coalition in v at x with Q ∩ S = ∅ and Q\S = ∅. Since Q is zero-excess, Q ∩ S is a zero excess coalition in v at x and thereby y
if Q is a zero-excess for z t0 by (4.1), we may conclude that t ∈ L and we get L = [0, 1] because [0, 1] is connected.
Proof. It is clear that x
S ∈ C(v |S ). Assume that x S = φ GL (v |S ) = y S . Then i∈S u i (x i ) < i∈S u i (y i ). By Lemma 4, (y S , x N \S ) ∈ C(v). Since i∈S u i (x i ) + i∈N \S u i (x i ) < i∈S u i y S i + i∈N \S u i (x i ), it is a contradiction that x = φ GL (v). For n ∈ N let φ c (v) = arg max{ i∈N u i (x i ) + cx n | x ∈ C(v)}, c ∈ R.
Lemma 5. φ c (v) is a continuous function of c.

Proof. Let c
Proof. Since C(v) is compact, and u i is differentiable on R for all i, sup 
Corollary 2. If c is sufficiently high
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 6 and Corollary 1.
Proof. Let x = φ c (v) and let y = φ d (v) . Now assume that x n < y n . Since
and since c > d, then also
Note that Lemmata 1, 5 and 7 do not hinge on convexity and apply to all balanced games v.
Lemma 8. There exists
ε > 0 such that φ c i (v) ≤ φ c−t i (v) for i ∈ N \n and 0 ≤ t ≤ ε.
Proof. Let x = φ c (v) and let y(t) = φ c−t (v)
. Let P = {P 1 , . . . , P k } be the ordered partition induced by x. As φ c (v) is a continuous function of c, we may, by differentiability of u i for i ∈ N , choose ε such that
Let y(t) = y, and letP = {P 1 , . . . ,P q } be the partition induced by y. Note thatP is a refinement of P.
Let n ∈ P l . The coalition
h=1 P h is a zero-excess coalition at x and at y. Thus, by Corollary 1,
since y = φ c−t (v) and a contradiction is obtained. To sum up, x i = y i for i / ∈ P l . Consider now the coalition P l . Let {P j1 , . . . ,P jr } be the partition of P l induced by y. Assume for some player With the preceding lemmata in place, we are able to prove that the generalized Lorenz solution satisfies population monotonicity when the utility functions are differentiable. (v) } satisfies population monotonicity on the class of convex games G.
Theorem 2. The generalized Lorenz solution
for all i ∈ N \n and we are done.
Extensions
Theorem 1 has the following bounded version. Let a, b ∈ R and let The proof of Theorem 3 is similar to that of Theorem 1. The following result is an important generalization of Theorem 1 as it states that coalitional monotonicity of the generalized Lorenz solution does not rest on differentiability of the individual utility functions. The proof of Lemma 10 is left to the reader. We shall now prove Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. Let u
For each i ∈ N we choose a sequence of strictly concave and differentiable functions u
Now turning towards an extension of Theorem 2, let a, b ∈ R. Denote by G(a, b) the bounded class of convex games
As in the case of Theorem 3 we can obtain a bounded version of Theorem 2. We are then able to prove that Theorem 2 does not hinge on the differentiability of the individual utility functions. 
Counter Examples
To demonstrate that separability of the social welfare function is essential for Theorems 1-6, we provide the following example: implying that α > 1. Then, there exists ε > 0 sufficiently small such that
That is φ(v) = (0, ε, 1 − ε) whereas φ(w) = (1/3, 0, 2/3) contradicting coalitional monotonicity. Moreover, φ 1 (v |{1,2} ) > 0 = φ 1 (v) contradicting population monotonicity.
To demonstrate that convexity is essential for Theorems 1-6, we provide the following example (note that in Young (1985) the counter-example concerns a five player game; in Housman and Clark (1998) 
